RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AGE DISCRIMINATION-EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION DETERMINES THAT A
UNITED STATES CORPORATION OPERATING IN WEST
GERMANY IS SUBJECT TO SUIT UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT-EMPLOYER' S
DEFENSE BASED ON COMPLIANCE WITH WEST GERMAN
LAW REJECTED
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has filed

suit against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) alleging that
the United States corporation violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) l by compulsorily retiring United States
citizens working in West Germany. The EEOC brought suit on January 23, 1989, and the case awaits trial in the district court. 2 In
defense to the action, RFE/RL has claimed that continued employment of the charging party would violate German law. The employer
is subject to a German court order approving a local labor-management agreement requiring the retirement of employees at age 65.1
This agreement contradicts the ADEA which prohibits discrimination
4
against persons aged 40 and older.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on
December 15, 1967, and the act became effective in June, 1968. 5 The
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (Supp. V 1987).

Cherian, Current Developments in Transnational Employment Rights, 1989
LABOR L. J. 261 [hereinafter Cherian].
Id. at 261.
4 29 U.S.C. § 623 (Supp. V 1987). As originally enacted, the statute covered
persons aged 40 to 65. The statute was amended in 1978 to cover persons aged 40
to 70. Finally, in 1986, the upper age limit was removed entirely.
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
2
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purpose of the act was "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." '6 The act prohibits discrimination on the basis of age
with respect to hiring, termination, compensation, or other conditions
7
of employment.
The resolution of the instant case will focus on two specific issues
regarding the ADEA. First, the EEOC may enforce the statute abroad
only if there is no existing authority which rejects such an application.
The RFE/RL case is the first application of the amendments to
discrimination that occurred after the amendments became effective.
Secondly, the EEOC can enforce the statute in Germany only if such
an application would, not cause the employer to violate a German
law.
A.

ExtraterritorialApplication of the ADEA

Prior to 1984, courts refused to construe the ADEA as applicable
to United States employers operating in foreign countries. Seven
circuits held that the act did not apply extraterritorially. 8 These courts
relied on the well established rule set out in Blackmer v. United
States where the Supreme Court held that "unless the contrary intent
appears, [a statute] is construed to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." 9
Courts also refused to extend the provisions of the ADEA extraterritorially because of its relationship to the Fair Labor Standards
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).

29 U.S.C. § 623 provides in relevant part:
It shall, be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which

would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age ....
Lopez v. Pan Am World Svcs., 813 F.2d 1118 (1lth Cir. 1987); De Yoreo v.

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986); Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley
Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985); Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d. 1121 (D.C.
Cir 1985); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984); Thomas

v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1984); Zahourek v. Arthur Young
and Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984).
9 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
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Act (FLSA).' 0 The ADEA incorporates the enforcement provisions
of the FLSA in § 626(b). 1 Section 213 of the FLSA's enforcement
provisions provides that "this title shall not apply with respect to
any employee whose services ...

are performed ...

in a foreign

country.' ' 2 On the basis of this reasoning, courts refused to apply
the ADEA extraterritorially in the absence of a clear congressional
intent to do so.
In passing the original version of the ADEA, Congress failed to
appreciate the growth in international trade and the effect which this
growth would have on the employment of older workers. The legislative history of the act is silent as to its extraterritorial applications. 3
Congress amended the act in 1978 to raise the age limit of its coverage
from age 65 to age 70.14 The legislative history of this amendment
reflects that Congress extended the act's coverage to approximately
38 million workers." However, Congress again failed to address the
application of the ADEA abroad. 16 This omission left United States
citizens working abroad beyond the act's protection. Courts and
commentators began to criticize this perceived void in ADEA coverage.
In Cleary v. United States Lines, the court refused to extend the
coverage of the ADEA to a United States employer operating in
England." The district court judge stated that "there is no valid
policy reason why this country's laws against age discrimination
should not apply to American citizens employed by American companies abroad."' 18 However, the Third Circuit refused to extend the
coverage of the ADEA without legislative authority to do so. Critics
of this void in the coverage of the ADEA claimed that the refusal
of courts to apply the act extraterritorially permitted employers to
circumvent the act by transferring older workers abroad for termi-

10

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).

2

29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b) (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982).

'3 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2215-67. In light of the 1984 amendments, the incorporation of the territorial limitation contained in § 213 of the FLSA
was apparently unintentional. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
14 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982).
'1 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 522.
See generally 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 504-37.
728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
16

555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.C.N.J. 1983) (cited language is from district court

opinion and does not appear in circuit court opinion).
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nation. 9 Critics also claimed that the ADEA should apply extraterritorially in a manner similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights act of
1964.20

In Bryant v. Int'l Schools Svcs., Inc., the court held that Title VII
protects United States citizens working abroad. 2' The court reached
this construction by negative implication. Title VII states that the
statute "shall not apply with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any state." ' 22 The court inferred that because the statute
specifically excluded aliens, Congress must have intended to include
United States citizens working abroad for United States employers
within the scope of the act's coverage. 23 Critics of Cleary and its
progeny argued that the ADEA is similar in purpose and language
to Title VII and that therefore, Congress intended for the two statutes
to apply to United States based employers operating abroad.2 4 These
critics contended that similarities between the FLSA and ADEA were

merely "technical.'

'25

Congress responded to the critics and to the district court's invitation in Cleary and amended the ADEA in 1984. In amending the
ADEA, the 98th Congress relied on the well-settled principle that it
has the power to extend the reach of its laws to American citizens
abroad.26 The Supreme Court in Blackmer v. United States held that
legislation will generally be construed to apply only within the ter-

19Note, Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.: The Protections of the ADEA Not
to Apply to American Citizens Employed Abroad 9 N. C.J. INT'L COM. REG. 173,
186, (1983) [hereinafter Protections]. See also Cleary, 555 F. Supp. 1263.
20 Protections, supra note 19; Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-7 (1982).
21 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.C.N.J. 1980).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982).
23 Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482.
24 See generally Protections, supra note 19, at 173-186.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color religion, sex, or national origin ....
Section 2000e-2 of Title VII is virtually identical to the operative section of the
ADEA. Compare § 2000e-2 to § 323 of the ADEA set out at note 7.
25

Protections, supra note 19, at 186.

26 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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ritorial jurisdiction of the United States. 27 However, the Blackmer
Court also acknowledged the power of Congress to reach United
States citizens abroad. The Court stated that "[wihile the legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is construed to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the question of its application so far as citizens of the United States in foreign
countries are concerned, is one of the construction, not legislative
power. ' 2 Following the reasoning of the critics, Congress also relied
29
on Bryant in passing the 1984 amendment.
The legislative history of the 1984 amendments suggests that Congress did not carefully consider the effects of the amendments. Congress attached the amendments to the Older Americans Act
reauthorization.30 The conference agreement on the ADEA amendments stated:
[T]he conferees have taken the unusual step of considering these
amendments within this reauthorization because of the lateness of
the session. The conferees do not intend this action to be viewed
as a precedent for future amendments to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act as a part of the Older Americans Act reauthorization.3"
The stated purpose of the amendment is "to insure that the citizens
of the United States who are employed in a foreign workplace by
U.S. Corporations or their subsidiaries enjoy the protection of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act." 3 2 The amendments added
subsection (f) to 29 USC § 623 to extend the Act's prohibitions to
foreign corporations controlled by American employers. 33 Congress
amended Subsection (f) (1) to exempt an employer from the prohibitions of the section when compliance would result in the violation
4
of the laws of a foreign country.1
The 1984 amendment drew sharp criticism. Critics claimed that it
was unnecessary and that Congress did not carefully consider its

Id.
Id.
29 Bryant v. Information School Svcs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.C.N.J. 1980).
30 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3037. Congress designed the Older
Americans Act to generally promote the welfare of elderly citizens. The Older
Americans Act is separate and distinct from the Age Discrimination Act.
31 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3037.
32 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3000.
33 The extraterritorial amendments now appear in subsection (g) of 29 U.S.C. §
623 (Supp. V 1986).
14
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3000.
27

28
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effects on international economic relations.35 Congressional proponents of the amendment to the ADEA relied on Bryant.3 6 However,
in Cleary, the Third Circuit questioned the reasoning of the Bryant
7
court's "negative inference" extraterritorial extension of Title VII."
Commentators and pre-1984 courts have also criticized the extraterritorial application of the ADEA because such an application violates
a long-standing policy against the extraterritorial application of labor
laws.
Such critics point to McCollough v. Sociedad de Marineros de
Hondurasas an example of a general policy against the extraterritorial
application of United States employment laws.38 McCoullough involved alien seaman on foreign vessels.3 9 The 1984 ADEA amendment
applies only to American companies and not to foreign employers.4
In Foley Bros. v. Filardo, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
Eight Hour Law to an American employer operating in Iran and
Iraq. 41 Although Foley can arguably be read, as critics of the 1984
ADEA amendments have read it, to espouse a general policy against
the extraterritorial application of labor laws, the Court in Foley
recognized the authority of Congress under Blackmer, to make such
extensions. 42 The foregoing authorities suggest that despite criticism
of the 1984 ADEA amendments, no clear mandate against extraterritorial application of United States fair employment laws exists. Court
opinions have recognized the authority of Congress to make such an
extension and have generally not questioned the propriety of doing
SO.

One motivation for the 1984 amendments was clearly misdirected.
In its invitation to Congress to amend the act, the district court in
Cleary expressed concern that an employer might avoid the ADEA
by transferring an older worker to a foreign country to be terminated. 43 Critics of the pre-1984 decisions refusing to apply the ADEA

11See generally Zimmerman, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Labor Laws:
Congress' Flawed Extension of the ADEA, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (1988)
[hereinafter Zimmerman].
36 Id. at 118.
31 Id. See also, Cleary v. United States Lines, 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1984).
"' 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
39 Id.

29 U.S.C. § 623 (Supp. V 1987).
336 U.S. 271, 281 (1948). The current version of the Eight Hour Law appears
at 40 U.S.C. § 328 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
42 Id. at 284. See note 26 and accompanying text.
43 Cleary v. United States Lines, 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.C.N.J. 1983).
40
41
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abroad also expressed this concern." The Seventh Circuit addressed
this possibility in Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co..45 In dicta, the
court stated that the pre-1984 ADEA would apply to such a transparent scheme to avoid the law.46 In testimony before Congress during
the debate over the 1984 amendments, the chairman of the EEOC
stated that it would consider such actions by an unscrupulous employer a violation under the pre-1984 version of the ADEA. 47 These
authorities reflect that the fear of such a subterfuge was unfounded.
B.

Foreign Compulsion Defense

The second issue which the court must address in resolving the
EEOC's suit against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is whether
the statute applies to an employer operating under a German courtapproved labor management agreement. The ADEA provides that its
prohibitions do not apply to an employer when compliance would
cause the employer to violate the laws of a foreign country. 48 However,
EEOC commissioner Joy Cherian recently stated that "[i]n prosecuting violations of Title VII and the ADEA... the [EEOC] adhere[s]
very strictly to the requirement that before an American company's
conduct abroad is found excusable there must indeed be a conflict
between the two laws." ' 49 In approving the suit against RFE/RL, the
EEOC apparently did not construe the "foreign laws" exception in
the ADEA to include court-approved labor management agreements.50
To date, no court has construed the breadth of the foreign law
conflict exception under the ADEA, and this issue before the district
court will be one of first impression.
Conflicts between foreign and domestic laws have been cited as an
objection to the application of United States employment laws in
foreign countries. In Pfeiffer, the court stated that "the fear of
outright collision between domestic and foreign law-collisions both
hard on the people caught in the cross fire and a potential source
of friction between the United States and foreign countries -lies
behind the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal

" Protections, supra note 19, at 186.
755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).

4

"

Id. at 559.

Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 119.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982).
,9 Cherian, supra note 2, at 261.
" Id.
47

48
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statutes."'" These concerns have prompted the creation of two related
doctrines which United States courts have applied respecting the laws
of foreign countries.
The act of state doctrine mandates that United States courts "will
generally refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign
state of property within its own territory, or from sitting in judgement
on other acts of a governmental character done by a state within its
own territory. 5 2 Courts originally based the doctrine solely on notions
of state sovereignty.13 Later cases cited a reluctance of the courts to
interfere with the executive foreign policy function as an additional
rationale for the doctrine.54 Another policy underlying the doctrine
is the maintenance of international comity." Based on these theories,
federal courts will refuse to hear claims that acts of a foreign sovereign
violate American or international law.
A related doctrine that has developed from the act of state doctrine
is the defense of foreign state compulsion. This doctrine provides
that "a state may not require a person to do an act in another state
that is prohibited by the law of that state." '5 6 The ADEA amendments
embody this concept, but there is no evidence in the legislative history
that Congress explicitly relied on this principle of foreign relations
law in formulating the 1984 amendments.5 7 The comments to the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law indicate that the foreign
compulsion defense will be available only when there is a risk that
the defendant is subject to severe sanctions. Comment c provides
that "the defense of foreign compulsion is in general available only
when the other state's requirements appear in binding laws or regulations subject to penal or other severe sanction. 5 8 Similarly,
comment d to § 441 provides that the participation by foreign governments in "essentially private arrangements" will not implicate the
defense of foreign compulsion.5 9
Courts have applied these principles of the Restatement most often
in anti-trust cases. In Timberlane v. Bank of America, the court
Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 557.
52 RESTATEMENT
3

(THiRD) oF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 (1986).

Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (White J. dissenting)
(1964).
1,Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979).
14

36 RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441

See generally 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.

(1986).

AND ADMIN. NEws 3000-3001, 3037.
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 comment c (1986).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 comment d (1986).
17
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recognized that corporate conduct compelled by foreign law is shielded
60
from antitrust liability, as if it were an act of the foreign state itself.
The court also noted, however, that "mere governmental approval
or foreign governmental involvement which the defendant had arranged does not necessarily provide a defense." ' 6' This holding is
consonant with comments c and d to Restatement § 441 .62
Courts have applied the foreign compulsion doctrine in a limited
number of employment cases. In Kern v. Dynaelectron Corp., the
court rejected the plaintiff's claim of religious discrimination and
found that the employer could exclude the plaintiff from employment
because a foreign law compelled it to do So. 63 The job in question
required flights into Mecca by the pilots of the defendant's aircraft.
Saudi Arabian law, which is based on Islamic religious beliefs, forbid
the entry of non-Moslems into the Holy City of Mecca and provided
for the beheading of any non-Moslems who violated this law. 4 The
court found that the defendant's requirement that its pilots convert
to the Moslem religion did not constitute religious discrimination
because foreign law compelled this requirement .65
The EEOC has held that an employer does not violate Title VII
when the laws of a foreign country forbid the employer from hiring
a qualified woman as an air traffic controller. 66 The laws of the
foreign country involved prohibited the employment of females in
jobs where contact with males would occur. 67 The EEOC found that
because the employer made an effort to employ the charging party
and the laws of a foreign country prevented him from doing so, no
68
violation of Title VII had occurred.
In Pfeiffer, a case factually similar to the instant case, the employer
raised the defense of foreign compulsion. The plaintiff sued under
the ADEA when the German subsidiary of the defendant terminated
his employment at age 65.69 The plaintiff in that case admitted the
- 549 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id.
62 RESTATEMENT (THIR) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 (1986).
63 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 746 F. 2d 810
(5th Cir 1977).
64 Id. at 1198.
65 Id.
66 Host Country Bars Hiring of Women in Foreign Job, [EPD 68511 (EEOC
1985). EEOC decisions are sanitized to remove the names of parties.
67 Host Country Bars Hiring of Women in Foreign Job, [EPD 6851]
(EEOC
1985).
61

6s Id.
69

Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1985).
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existence of a German law that required retirement at age 65.70
However, the defendant produced no evidence of the existence of
the law. 71 In dicta, the court stated that if such a law did exist, the
pre-1984 ADEA would yield to such a law.72 These cases indicate
that courts will narrowly interpret any defense an employer may have
based on the laws of a foreign host country.
A similar case against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reached
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985. 73 The
plaintiff in Ralis sued under the ADEA after his involuntary discharge
at age 65. The Court rejected Ralis' claim because the discharge
occurred before the 1984 Amendments became effective.74 Although
the Court makes no mention of the fact, presumably Ralis was
discharged under the same labor-management agreement as the plaintiff in the instant case.
III.

ANALYsis

There is no basis in existing case law for the courts to refuse to
give effect to the 1984 amendments and apply the ADEA to American
companies operating in foreign countries. No clear mandate against
such an application exists as is evidenced by the extraterritorial application of Title VII in Bryant. Although there are compelling reasons
of international policy not to make such an application, the courts
cannot inquire into such reasons.
Commentators have identified numerous problems resulting from
the extraterritorial application of domestic laws. First, the rules of
domestic discovery may be different in the host country, thus making
investigation and enforcement onerous. 75 The ADEA and Title VII
vests the EEOC with investigation and enforcement authority. 76 In
the RFE/RL case, for example, the EEOC is likely to encounter
serious difficulties with discovery under German law. A recent article
notes that the American and West German procedural systems differ
with respect to the structure of the litigation process, the roles of
the parties, the handling of facts, and the scope of evidentiary bur70 Id. at 558.
71 Id.
72

71

74
71
76

Id.
Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1131.
Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 108.
29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e - (1982).
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dens.7 7 Germany is a civil law country and the EEOC would encounter
similar difficulties enforcing and investigating alleged Title VII and
ADEA violates in other civil law countries. 78 In fact, as one commentator notes, with respect to extraterritorial discovery, "the United
States [is] in conflict with the rest of the world." 1 9 Referring to
antitrust cases, Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield stated
that no area has been more sensitive nor raised more difficult questions
than that involving the discovery of evidence abroad.w0
A second problem identified by critics of the Amendments, which
may arise when employment laws are imposed abroad, is blocking
legislation by the host country.8 ' Antitrust cases provide good examples of foreign resistance to the extraterritorial application of
United States laws. Foreign governments have passed legislation to
frustrate investigations by limiting the production of business records.12 Foreign Countries have also passed statutes specifically aimed
at preventing enforcement of judgments rendered in the United States. 3
Such countries act out of a belief that the application of United
States laws to corporations within their jurisdiction is a violation of
4
international law and an infringement on their sovereignty.
Critics of the Amendments also point out that the application of
United States employment laws abroad may also generate diplomatic
protests. 5 These types of protests have occurred frequently in relation
to the application of antitrust laws abroad. 6 Such protests may be
aimed at the executive branch, through the Department of State or
directly to the courts.8 7 Some governments have even participated

11Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems:
Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. Comp. L. 748 - 57 (1986) [hereinafter
Gerber].
71 Gerber, supra note 77, at 748.
79 Id.
s0

J.

GRIFFIN,

PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL

APPLICATION OF UNITED

19 (1979).
,Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 120-21.
82 J.ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 102105 (2d ed 1981). Atwood reports that several generally friendly countries have
enacted legislation with an intent to frustrate United States enforcement of domestic
laws. These countries include Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, West
Germany, France, New Zealand, and Australia [hereinafter ATWOOD & BREWSTER].
Id. at 104.
Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign Nations, 40 Dep't St.
Bull. 272, 273 (1959) [hereinafter Becker].
:5 Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 123.
6 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 82, at 101.
17 Becker, supra note 84, at 274.
STATES ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS
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directly in litigation by filing briefs amicus curiae.8 8 In addition to
those types of civilized foreign reactions, foreign governments have
contended the application of antitrust laws with threats of economic
9
or political retaliation.8
Another foreign policy problem with the application of United
States employment laws abroad is that such an application contravenes
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties.90 Such a treaty exists
with West Germany as well as other significant trading partners. 9'
The purpose of these treaties is "to give corporations of each signatory
legal status in the territory of the other party, and to allow them to
conduct business in the other country on a comparable basis with
domestic firms." 92 An application of United States employment laws
interferes with the relationship between the government of the host
country and the corporation subjected to the employment laws.
Furthermore, extraterritorial application of employment laws to
United States nationals may afford those nationals greater legal protection than the host country affords such nationals. This interference
with the authority of the host country to regulate corporations and
individuals within its territory clearly violates the spirit of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties. This application of domestic
laws may also create a disincentive to hire American citizens to work
in foreign countries, thus depriving United States citizens of employment opportunities that are often attractive. Although these considerations do not provide the court with a basis for refusing to give
effective to the 1984 extraterritorial amendments, they do provide
compelling reasons to limit the adverse effects of extraterritorial
application of the ADEA by interpreting the foreign compulsion
defense broadly.
For the defendant to prevail in this case, it must rely on the defense
of foreign compulsion. This defense is statutorily recognized by the
1984 ADEA Amendments and has been generally recognized by case
law and other authorities. 9 Although the court cannot reject the
1sATWOOD

& BREWSTER, supra note 82, at 101.
at 100.
10 Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 125.
9, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States
- Federal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. no. 3593. See also Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr, 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No.2863 and Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation,
Aug. 23, 1951, United States-Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948.
92 Sumitoumo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 182 (1982).
93 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f); see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
89

Id.
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extraterritorial application of the ADEA on the basis of policy reasons, it can restrict that application and thereby promote sound
international trade policy by interpreting the foreign compulsion defense broadly. Such an interpretation would accommodate the realities
faced by domestic corporations operating abroad and would also
respect the regulations imposed by foreign sovereigns. If the ADEA
is to be applied to corporations operating in foreign countries, it
should be applied only where doing so would not place the corporation
in the impossible position of compliance with conflicting laws or
would not infringe on the sovereignty of a foreign state.9
Despite the compelling reasons for a broad interpretation of the
defense of foreign compulsion, existing authorities have generally
interpreted the defense more narrowly. The Restatement provides that
there must be a risk of a severe sanction before the defense can
apply. 95 The violation of a labor management agreement probably
will not subject RFE/RL to the risk of severe sanctions. At most,
the employer will be subjected to the possibility of a civil suit by
the labor representative. Furthermore, this case can be distinguished
from the EEOC decision and Kern because both of those cases
involved the violation of foreign laws, not merely a private courtapproved agreement.
The foreign compulsion defense should be recognized when an
employer is faced with either violating a court-approved labor management agreement or violating United States discrimination laws.
Other governments, like West Germany, assume a more active role
in negotiating and enforcing labor agreements than does the United
States. Transnational corporations who choose to operate in a par96
ticular state must be willing to submit to the laws of that state.

94 The difficulties encountered by a federal court in applying the ADEA to
American companies operating abroad implicate similar difficulties in applying Title
VII. As the district court noted in Cleary, "the prohibitions of the ADEA are
virtually in haec verba." Courts have similarly applied the statutes and they share
similar defenses. The defense of foreign compulsion usually surfaces when an employer raises a foreign regulation as a bona fide occupational qualification. Courts
apply the bona fide occupational qualification defense similarly in ADEA and Title

VII cases (Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 409 (1985)) Therefore, the

same extraterritorial problems in the EEOC suit against RFE/RL occur in cases
involving racial, ethnic, or sex discrimination.
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 comment c (1986).
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The extraterritorial application of United States employment laws
burdens transnational corporations with a dual compliance obligation
that converts basic managerial decisions into a complex exercise in
comparative law. A broad interpretation of the foreign compulsion
defense would alleviate the burden of dual compliance and impose
liability only when local conditions in the host country do not govern
an employers' conduct. Previous applications of the defense of foreign
compulsion indicate that it should apply in the instant case. The
sovereign prerogative of the West German government to participate
in labor relations is as entitled to deference as the prerogative of
Saudi Arabia to behead non-Moslems found within the city of Mecca.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As with Radio Free Europe in the instant case, multinational corporations suffer great hardship when United States fair employment
laws are imposed upon their operations in foreign countries. Such
an imposition also raises questions of sovereignty and can jeopardize
international economic relations.9 The history of the 1984 Amendments to the ADEA indicates that Congress did not carefully consider
the effects of extraterritorial application of the act on multinational
corporations or on international trade relations. By interpreting the
defense of foreign compulsion broadly, courts can alleviate the burden
of dual compliance placed on transnational corporations and avoid
aggravation of international trade relations.
Chris Lauderdale

Trade relations with West Germany have been generally favorable. West Germany actually enjoys a larger monthly trade surplus (approximately $30 billion) with
the United States than does Japan (approximately $20 billion). Despite this difference,
most of the protectionist rhetoric in the United States is directed toward Japan.
This is because West German Trade policies are generally favorable to the maintenance
of international trade comity. See Truell, Why Reactions Differ To Japan and
Germany, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1990, at A-1, col. 5.

